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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 25, 2003, heavily armed police surrounded the private jet 
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the billionaire head of Russia’s then leading oil 
producer Yukos, and arrested him.1  The following months witnessed the 
government-orchestrated destruction of Yukos through sweeping arrests of 
the oil giant’s top managers and a barrage of massive tax assessments and 
penalties.2  The final blow came in December 2004 with the auction of 
Yuganskneftegaz,3 Yukos’ most prized production entity, which alone 
accounted for 60 percent of the oil company’s output.4  The $9.3 billion 
winning bid was submitted by a previously unknown entity named 
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 1. MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, PETROSTATE:  PUTIN, POWER, AND THE NEW RUSSIA 116 
(2008). 
 2. See Id. at 116-20 (noting the “more than two dozen people associated with Yukos 
who have either been jailed or have fled into exile.”). 
 3. “Neft” and “gaz” are the Russian words for “petroleum” and “natural gas” 
respectively. 
 4. See Id. at 120 (stating that “[s]everal outside appraisers insisted that the price was 
less than half of what such an auction should have yielded.”). 
CARBONELLFINAL_EIGHT 1/22/2010  5:17:14 PM 
258 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
Baikalfinansgroup,5 which days later merged with the state-controlled oil 
company Rosneft.6  In little over a year, as if suddenly struck by the 
thunderbolt of an enraged god, Yukos’ market capitalization, which in 
2003 had surpassed $40 billion, had plummeted 95 percent to roughly $2 
billion.7  When the dust finally settled, the Russian government had 
effectively renationalized the Yukos Oil Company.8 
The Russian state’s intense effort to dismantle Yukos and, ultimately, 
re-acquire the private oil company’s assets, ushered in a new era.  The 
laissez-faire government policy that fuelled the free-wheeling “market 
euphoria”9 characteristic of Russia’s energy sector in the 1990s10 had come 
to an abrupt end.  A new, more sobering state project had succeeded:  the 
reassertion of state control over Russia’s vast energy resources.  Russia’s 
former president and current Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, spearheaded 
the policy shift, asserting that Russia could regain its superpower status by 
rerouting oil and natural gas profits from the private sector to the state.  
Russia could then use the energy revenues to further national interests.11  
Putin emphasizes the need to “rationalize” the natural gas and petroleum 
industries in order to promote the search for new crude deposits and 
technological innovation and use Russia’s energy wealth to further the 
Russian state’s grand strategy.12  The notion of state control occupies an 
important space in the new energy policy, perhaps justifiably so given the 
Russian government’s meager tax revenues and the damage done to the 
state bureaucracy by the precipitous privatization campaign of the early 
1990s.13 
The new policy’s objective of achieving state dominance in Russia’s 
energy sector poses a serious threat to private petroleum and natural gas 
companies, especially companies with high foreign equity participation or 
 
 5. Several names for this entity exist in the literature, including “Baikal Finance 
Group.”  I am using Matteo M. Winkler’s translation, infra note 6. 
 6. Matteo M. Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil:  The Yukos Case 
Before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 115, 120 n.23 (2006). 
 7. Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 17 at 7, In re Yukos Oil Co., Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). 
 8. This is, of course, a controversial claim, which will be discussed later in more 
detail. 
 9. Harley Balzer, The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy, 21 POST-SOVIET AFF. 
210, 218 (2005) (quoting V. V. Putin, Mineral’no-syr’evyye resursy v strategii razvitiya 
Rossiyskoy ekonomiki [Mineral natural resources in the strategy for development of the 
Russian economy], 144 ZAPISKI GORNOGO INSTITUTA, 1999, at 7). 
 10. See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 57-65 (describing the chaos of the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises in the energy sector, including the notoriously self-dealing “Loans 
for Shares” program). 
 11. Id. at 97. 
 12. Balzer, supra note 9, at 218. 
 13. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 57. 
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those managed by foreign executives.14  The destruction of Yukos, though 
perhaps motivated by many distinct interests, has established an archetype 
of government acquisition:  investigations by the tax authorities followed 
by the lodging of massive back-tax claims and penalties, which Russian 
courts uphold.  While some analysts contend that the expropriation of 
Yukos will remain an isolated incident,15 such a conclusion does not 
comport with the stated ideology of the Putin administration, which stresses 
state ownership and control of natural resources.16  The literature treating 
the relationship between the Russian state and the private energy sector 
indicates that government aggression toward private firms continues, and 
the state may, indeed, launch another major expropriation if such a move 
were to dovetail with Russian grand strategy.  Private firms, and 
particularly foreign firms, operating in Russia’s petroleum and natural gas 
sector must understand that the risk of expropriation, among other forms of 
state hostility, is real, and plan potential litigation strategy accordingly. 
Moreover, Russian courts have increasingly demonstrated their 
dependence on the executive branch of the Russian government.17  Thus, 
one of the most urgent legal needs for private energy companies is to 
escape the Russian court system and gain access to a foreign national court 
sitting in either the United States or Western Europe, or an international 
arbitral tribunal.  The threshold issue for determining access to any of these 
fora is jurisdiction, for without this “power to declare the law . . . the court 
cannot proceed at all in any cause.”18  Taking up the jurisdictional gauntlet 
remains a thorny challenge, regardless of the greater litigation strategy, and 
restrains the range of legal options available to a private oil company 
seeking to litigate outside of Russia.  Courts in the United States and 
Western Europe routinely grapple with questions regarding sovereign 
immunity, minimum contacts, a company’s center of main interests, and 
others.  After careful examination of two alternatives, this comment 
concludes that bringing suit in the United States for expropriation of 
property under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)19 
represents the better litigation strategy for a private energy company 
operating in Russia, which has suffered an illegal nationalization of 
 
 14. See Balzer, supra note 9, at 221 (“All [oil companies] are subject to the threat of 
sharing Yukos’ fate . . . .”). 
 15. See Philip Hanson, Observations on the Costs of the Yukos Affair to Russia, 46 
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 481, 490 (2005) (suggesting that the Kremlin will not 
repeat a Yukos-style expropriation). 
 16. See generally Balzer, supra note 9 (analyzing the ideas behind Putin’s doctoral 
dissertation, which argues for state control over the use of Russia’s energy resources). 
 17. See Hanson, supra note 15, at 484 (“[T]he Russian state can use a procuracy and 
courts that will do the state’s will, regardless of the letter and spirit of the law.”). 
 18. In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 19. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000). 
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property by the Russian state. 
This comment is composed of two major sections.  The first section 
provides background on the policy shift adopted by the Putin 
administration, defining government control of Russia’s energy resources 
as a paramount objective.  Furthermore, the first section examines some of 
the tactics embraced by the Putin administration to effectuate the policy of 
state control.  Finally, this section introduces Yukos—describing its fate 
and the reasons behind the intensity of its dismemberment—and TNK-BP, 
a giant private oil company half-owned by BP and half-owned by the 
Alpha-Access-Renova (AAR) group, a consortium headed by four Russian 
oligarchs. 
The second section will analyze two methods for legally defending 
TNK-BP and other private oil companies from expropriation of their assets 
by the Russian government.  The comment will examine the feasibility of 
bringing a suit in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA), including potential challenges to jurisdiction and the cause of 
action.  Moreover, the comment will review another litigation alternative:  
initiating arbitration according to the rules of the International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention of 1965 (hereinafter 
ICSID Convention).  The comment will ultimately conclude that a suit 
under the FSIA represents the more attractive litigation strategy for a 
company such as TNK-BP. 
Taking on the Russian state is a formidable task.  Even if one manages 
to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction, one must still defend against the 
Russian state and other defendants’ motions to dismiss for various causes, 
including forum non conveniens and the U.S. Act of State Doctrine.  Even 
surmounting these defendant-generated challenges does not guarantee 
against the court sua sponte dismissing a case, not on jurisdictional 
grounds, but rather based on a weighing of the totality of circumstances.20  
The literature treating Russian energy sector politics and international 
jurisdiction is vast.  This comment focuses on several key articles and cases 
that offer guidance to the problem of litigating against the Russian state 
with regard to energy sector expropriation.  This comment does not purport 
to be a comprehensive proposal for saving TNK-BP or other firms from 
renationalization, but rather seeks to investigate the challenge posed by 
Russian policy and explore ways for a private energy company to legally 
meet that challenge. 
 
 20. See In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 411 (concluding the Yukos’ Chapter 11 case should be 
dismissed based only on the totality of the circumstances). 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE SHIFT TOWARD STATE CONTROL OF THE 
ENERGY SECTOR 
 
The Putin administration’s decision to reign in the energy sector and 
assert government control over it came after a decade of free market 
experimentation.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin 
administration led a massive effort to privatize state-owned enterprises and 
foster the transition toward Western-style, free-market capitalism.  In 
Petrostate, Marshall I. Goldman, gives a vivid account of the chaos 
spawned by precipitous privatization, particularly in the petroleum and 
natural gas industries.21  What were in Soviet times monolithic government 
ministries, were cut up and packaged into smaller assets, most of which 
ended up in private hands.22  Soon, “oligarchs” like Khodorkovsky came to 
control vast energy resources and amass large fortunes.23 
The problem for Putin and his administration had less to do with the 
sheer wealth of the oligarchs than with the economic and political power 
that they grew accustomed to wielding.  Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of 
the Presidential Administration under Putin, captured the mood of the 
Kremlin vis-à-vis the powerful private elites in a May 17, 2005 discussion 
with business representatives:  “[W]e will not allow a small group of 
companies to be the power in the country, where they permeate the state 
apparatus.”24  Surkov went on to criticize what he saw as an “offshore 
aristocracy” composed of oligarchs and other wealthy Russian elites whose 
loyalty to Russian national interests had become ambiguous.25  Not only 
did rich Russians cultivate greater ties with the West, including the transfer 
of large funds to Western bank accounts,26 but elites in the energy sector 
had begun to assume traditional state roles, such as negotiating contracts 
with foreign sovereigns.  For example, prior to his arrest, Khodorkovsky 
favored the opening of the Chinese market to Russian petroleum and had 
agreed to build an oil pipeline into China.27  The Russian government not 
only preferred the construction of a pipeline link to Japan, but also “sought 
to limit China’s growing power.”28  Khodorkovsky’s unilateral negotiations 
 
 21. See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 57-65 (describing the chaos of the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises in the energy sector, including the notoriously self-dealing “Loans 
for Shares” program). 
 22. Id. at 58-62. The notable exception to this was Gazprom (formerly the Ministry of 
the Natural Gas Industry), which remained largely intact after the wave of privatization. 
 23. Id. at 64, 106. 
 24. Hanson, supra note 15, at 483 (quoting Surkov). 
 25. Id. at 484. 
 26. Id. at 486. 
 27. Balzer, supra note 9, at 220. 
 28. Id. 
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with the Chinese government clashed with the Russian state’s grand 
strategy for the country.  This type of action with respect to China 
illustrates the kind of prerogatives that the Putin administration believed 
should rightly belong to the state alone. 
For Putin, Khodorkovsky’s sua sponte foreign policy maneuverings 
stemmed from the myopic policies of the 1990s.  In an effort to modernize 
Russia, the Yeltsin administration sacrificed the state’s power and spoiled a 
generation of wealthy elites, who now stood convinced that they spoke for 
Russia.  According to Putin, “[u]nfortunately, when market reforms began 
the state lost control of the resource sector.  However, now the market 
euphoria of the first years of economic reform is gradually giving way to a 
more measured approach . . . .”29  This excerpt demonstrates Putin’s 
apparent disdain for the Yeltsin liberalizations, characterizing the market 
they engendered as a manic episode.  Putin’s approach, in contrast, 
promises to be “measured.”  In other words, Putin promises calculated 
moves, which will correct a mistake as catastrophic as “los[ing] control of 
the resource sector,” and the attendant loss of sovereignty.  With the 
introduction of Putin’s new policy, the Russian government, not private 
individuals, will make all the big decisions regarding the production and 
distribution—including export—of Russian petroleum and natural gas. 
Putin’s New Energy Policy 
In 1997, Vladimir Putin earned a “Kandidat of Sciences degree in 
economics,” for which he defended a thesis regarding the Russian state’s 
role in the energy sector.30  Harley Balzer examines the substance of 
Putin’s ideas in his article The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy.31  
According to Balzer, Putin and his associates “have a clear view of what 
they are about”32: 
If used effectively, mineral resources can provide the basis for 
Russia’s entry into the world economy;33  
… 
[T]he existing socio-economic conditions and also the strategy 
for Russia’s exit from the deep crisis and restoration of its former 
power on a qualitatively new basis demonstrate that the condition 
of the natural resource complex remains the most important 
factor in the state’s development in the near term.34 
 
 29. Id. at 218 (quoting Putin, supra note 9, at 7). 
 30. Id. at 211. 
 31. Balzer, supra note 9. 
 32. Id. at 222. 
 33. Id. at 217. 
 34. Id. at 219 (quoting Putin, supra note 9, at 9). 
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These excerpts reveal that, for Putin, energy resources represent an 
opportunity for Russia to recover economically and re-emerge on the 
geopolitical stage as a superpower.  The oil and natural gas should further 
the revitalization of the entire country.  Goldman corroborates this 
interpretation:  “Instead of allowing the country’s oligarch-controlled 
corporations to focus exclusively on making a profit, Putin proposed that 
they should be used instead to advance the country’s national interests.”35  
Goldman emphasizes that Putin favors the notion of “national champions,” 
leading companies that would not only produce vast streams of wealth for 
Russia, but would also assume a social mission, such as providing low cost 
fuel at home through subsidies, while charging prevailing market prices 
abroad.36  The “national champions” would be “vertically integrated 
financial-industrial groups to compete with Western multinationals.”37  
Despite the nationalism inherent in Putin’s ideas, the state would encourage 
foreign investment, “but those investors must understand that Russia would 
retain operating control, investment or no investment.”38  In short, under 
Putin’s watch, the Russian energy sector would become national, and 
would serve the interests of Russia, much like the military, the foreign 
service, and other state institutions. 
Ideological Justification 
The new policy has two principal justifications:  ideology and 
practicality.  The main ideological driver is that Russia must become a 
superpower again and play a role in world affairs.  This is the grand 
strategy.  As the evidence cited above confirms, Putin sees energy as the 
route toward renewed superpower status.  Moreover, as Russia rebuilds its 
power, it must take care not to empower rival states such as China.  Indeed, 
no other emerging nation should ride Russia’s coattails toward its own 
renaissance.  As demonstrated above, Khodorkovsky’s unilateral “treaty” 
with China for the building of an oil pipeline would have represented a 
major setback to the Putin administration’s grand strategy, and therefore 
could not stand. 
Moreover, the third component of the ideology is that Russia should 
care for its people and fully recover from the Soviet Union’s collapse.  The 
Yeltsin years led to power and wealth for the few lucky or ruthless enough 
to snatch it.  Yet, the vast majority of Russians ended up with nothing to 
show for the fast-tracked privatization plan.39  The new energy sector 
 
 35. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 97. 
 36. Id. at 98-99. 
 37. Balzer, supra note 9, at 214. 
 38. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 98. 
 39. See id. at 58 (describing how ordinary Russians sold their privatization vouchers 
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policy would serve to remedy these social ills:  “[The raw materials sector] 
represents the basis for modernizing Russia’s military-industrial complex.  
It promotes social stability and can raise the well-being of the 
population.”40  The revitalized military would provide thousands of new 
jobs; an increase in manufacturing would have the same result.  The wealth 
generated by fossil fuel exports would swell the state’s stabilization fund, 
which could curb inflation and ultimately supply infrastructure, healthcare, 
and education investment.  Thus, natural resources could raise standards for 
ordinary Russians. 
The new energy ideology rests on a fundamental understanding of the 
relationship between the state and the land.  As Sergey Ivanov, defense 
minister under Putin, states:  “[M]inerals and resources are state property, 
not private.  Therefore the state has the full right to control this process and 
manage it in the interest of the entire country’s development.”41  Putin 
holds a similar view:  “Regardless of who [sic] the legal owner of the 
country’s natural resources [sic] and in particular the mineral resources, the 
state has the right to regulate the process of their development and use.”42  
The extent of this regulation remains ambiguous; “use” is open to wide 
interpretation, and can reasonably encompass sales, such as exports to a 
rival state.  The important point is that the concept of inherent state 
ownership of raw materials undergirds the ideological driver for asserting 
government control over the energy sector. 
Practical Justification 
The practical justification for the new policy dovetails with the 
ideological justification—lending further support for the notion that the 
state should reassert control over the petroleum and natural gas industries.  
The practical argument consists of two parts:  the failure of market forces 
and meager state revenues.  As to the first part, Putin has this to say:  “The 
financial condition of enterprises in the extractive and processing industries 
today, using uncompetitive technologies in their production processes, 
lacking budgets for geologic exploration work—all this means state 
agencies must support organizing financial-industrial groups . . . .”43  
Market forces have apparently failed to provide incentives for private 
investment in new technology and exploration of new oil and gas fields, 
with the consequence that the Russian energy sector will not be self-
sustaining once current field exploitation exhausts known reserves.  
 
“and [their] entitlement to a share of stock for a bottle of vodka or a few rubles”). 
 40. Balzer, supra note 9, at 217. 
 41. Id. at 213. 
 42. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 97-98. 
 43. Balzer, supra note 9, at 217 (quoting Putin, supra note 9, at 6). 
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Defense Minister Ivanov shares this view:  “[I]n recent years we have 
become convinced that private companies will not invest in exploration 
work.”44  Furthermore, Ivanov bears his frustration at the fact that the 
Soviet Union conducted all the exploration, from which wealthy elites now 
benefit.45 
Market forces also fail to take into account grand strategic 
considerations.  According to Balzer:  “Mr. Putin asserts that rational 
resource use, environmental protection, and ensuring long-term energy 
security are beyond the capacity of market mechanisms.”46  For Putin, 
“rational resource use” means furthering the overall interests of the state 
vis-à-vis foreign powers.  Khodorkovsky’s abortive deal with China did not 
factor in Russian statecraft.47  Additionally, the failure of most Russians to 
pay taxes illustrates the disconnect between Russian business goals and 
government plans.48 
Methods of Reigning in the Energy Sector 
In order to effectuate its goal of asserting control over the energy 
sector in line with the Putin administration’s new policy ideology, the 
Russian government utilizes several main tactics.  One of the most 
effective is the maintenance of a state monopoly on all oil and gas pipelines 
within Russia.  For example, in 2007, TNK-BP (to be fully introduced 
later) ran into trouble with regard to Gazprom’s (the semi-private successor 
to the Ministry of the Natural Gas Industry) control over gas pipelines.  In 
the normal course of extracting petroleum, TNK-BP also encountered 
natural gas deposits, which it could have sold and transported via the 
Gazprom network.  However, the natural gas giant did not allow TNK-BP 
access to the gas pipeline, with the result that TNK-BP could not produce 
enough gas to fulfill a nine billion cubic meter expectation for the year.49  
Goldman describes Putin’s displeasure at the unrealized gas extraction, and 
adds that “[t]he Russian owners of TNK[-BP] were reported to believe that 
this was all a pressure tactic to force them to sell their share of the 
partnership at a cheaper price to Gazprom.”50  This example demonstrates 
how the pipeline monopoly squeezes private energy companies, because in 
 
 44. Id. at 213 (quoting Ivanov). 
 45. Id. (not quoting Ivanov). 
 46. Id. at 218. 
 47. Id. at 220 (“If private interest were building the pipelines, market-based economic 
calculations would be paramount, not geostrategy.”). 
 48. See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 57 (“[I]n 2000, even after nearly a decade of private 
ownership, only 3 million Russians out of the 70 million who were supposed to pay taxes 
actually did so.”). 
 49. Id. at 131. 
 50. Id. 
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addition to pressure to live up to state production expectations in the face of 
uncooperative players like Gazprom, the private firms must contend with a 
slew of environmental regulations that carry heavy fiscal penalties, if 
violated.51 
Other methods of asserting government control include discriminatory 
regulation that favors companies with majority Russian ownership,52 and 
the placing of loyal and likeminded people in key energy posts.53  The most 
dramatic exercise of state power in furtherance of the new Putin policy is 
expropriation of the assets of private oil companies.  While the claim that 
the Russian state has and will continue to engage in confiscatory practices 
has engendered controversy, the literature on the Yukos affair lends support 
to the idea that the Russian government does contemplate expropriation in 
order to meet objectives.  According to Balzer:  “[I]f another major 
challenge [after Yukos] to state control of the ‘commanding heights’ of 
Russia’s energy sector were to materialize, the government would not 
hesitate to intervene decisively”;54 “[a]ll [oil companies] are subject to the 
threat of sharing Yukos’s fate.”55  In this excerpt, Balzer uses the word 
“intervene,” in reference to confiscatory action.  Goldman agrees:  “The 
attacks on Yukos and Mikhail Khodorkovsky highlight Putin’s determined 
effort to reign in these upstart oligarchs and at the same time renationalize 
and refashion their property into state companies and his vaunted national 
champions.”56  Despite the controversy over whether Russia really can or 
has expropriated private property, little evidence contradicts the fact that 
adequate checks on Russia’s executive branch do not exist.57  
Consequently, if the Putin administration did decide to implement its policy 
via expropriation, very little would stand in its way. 
Background on Yukos 
With the attack on Yukos, the Russian state established a precedent 
and procedure for how to expropriate a private energy company.  Yukos 
was one of the largest private oil companies in Russia prior to its 
dismantling.58  Mikhail Khodorkovsky was its CEO, with an estimated 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 127 (describing a law barring companies with less than 51% Russian 
ownership from conducting new exploration). 
 53. See id. at 139 (describing how Putin “purge[d] the self-dealers and asset-strippers 
from Gazprom.”); id. at 104 (describing how Putin replaced senior Gazprom executives with 
Putin’s associates, including Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s current president). 
 54. Balzer, supra note 9, at 211. 
 55. Id. at 221. 
 56. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 105. 
 57. Balzer, supra note 9, at 223. 
 58. Winkler, supra note 6, at 116; see also Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for 
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wealth of $15 billion dollars prior to his arrest.59  After Khodorkovsky’s 
arrest, the Russian tax authorities leveled a barrage of back-tax claims 
against Yukos, some of which exceeded Yukos’ total revenue for given 
years.60  Russian courts confirmed the tax authority’s claims, though the tax 
assessment’s accuracy was challenged on various occasions to no avail:  
“Whenever someone came up with a calculation that showed that the 
company’s assets were actually more valuable than indicated in earlier 
estimates, the tax authorities would recalculate the overdue tax debt and 
somehow come out with an even larger estimate.”61  In order to cover the 
debts owed to it, the Russian government put up for auction Yukos’ most 
valuable production asset, Yuganskneftegaz.62  The auction was scheduled 
for December 19, 2004, and Gazprom was expected to participate with 
funding from leading international banks, including Deutsche Bank.63 
Days before the commencement of the auction, Yukos initiated a 
bankruptcy proceeding in Houston, Texas and received a temporary 
restraining order against the Russian government and all third-party 
financiers of the bidders.64  The auction went ahead as planned, although 
without the participation of Gazprom or the international banks.65  The 
winner, Baikalfinansgroup, was quickly merged with the state-owned 
Rosneft oil company.66 
Yukos tried to defend itself through the Houston bankruptcy 
proceeding, filing its application for protection from creditors under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.67  Though Yukos had almost no 
ties with Texas, the Houston bankruptcy court found jurisdiction under 11 
U.S.C. § 109(a)68 based on the fact that Yukos’ financial director had been 
living in Texas since Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Yukos had created a 
subsidiary in Houston the same day it filed for protection, and Yukos had 
two recently-opened bank accounts in Houston.69  Despite the fact that the 
Houston court found jurisdiction, the court dismissed Yukos’ application 
 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction ¶ 11 at 5, In re Yukos Oil Co., 
Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (“Yukos and its subsidiaries are 
the largest producers of crude oil in Russia, and the largest exporters of crude oil from 
Russia.”). 
 59. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 105. 
 60. Id. at 120. 
 61. Id. at 121. 
 62. Giuditta Cordero Moss, Between Private and Public International Law:  Exorbitant 
Jurisdiction as Illustrated by the Yukos Case, 32 REV. CENT. E. EUR. L. 1, 2 (2007). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2-3. 
 65. Winkler, supra note 6, at 120; GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 120. 
 66. Winkler, supra note 6, at 120 n.23. 
 67. Cordero Moss, supra note 62, at 2. 
 68. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); Winkler, supra note 6, at 118. 
 69. Cordero Moss, supra note 62, at 3. 
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based on an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances.70  Yukos’ main 
problem in the Houston case, therefore, was not jurisdiction, but rather 
other factors, such as the fact that Yukos had sought relief in other fora, 
including Russia, and also that Yukos was such a large and politically 
important company for the Russian Federation.71 
Background on TNK-BP 
TNK-BP appears to be at risk of suffering expropriation at the hands 
of the Russian government.  In contrast to Yukos, TNK-BP did not begin as 
a primarily Russian company, but rather was formed by a merger between 
BP’s energy holdings in Russia and the Tyumen Oil Company (TNK).72  
BP owns 50 percent of TNK-BP, and the Alpha-Access-Renova group 
(AAR) owns the other half.73  Again, in contrast to Yukos, BP has a clear 
foreign presence, not only in the equity ownership structure of the 
company, but also in the management, which until recently consisted of BP 
executives.74  Apparently, Putin was displeased by the fact that TNK-BP 
was not majority Russian-owned.75 
Given the Putin administration’s ideological stance, TNK-BP is 
doubly vulnerable because of its size and because of its large foreign equity 
ownership, both of which pose a threat to the Russian state’s grand 
strategy.  In fact, TNK-BP has already experienced problems with the 
Russian environmental authorities, as well as with Gazprom’s monopoly 
control over Russia’s gas pipelines.76  Should the Russian government seek 
more aggressively to assert control over TNK-BP, no real barrier would 
stand in the way of confiscatory action.  Consequently, TNK-BP and other 
private companies operating in the Russian energy sector must consider 
viable litigation options as one possible line of defense against 
expropriation. 
TNK-BP would be unlikely to prevail in a Russian court.  As Philip 
Hanson notes:  “The Russian state can use a procuracy and courts that will 
do the state’s will, regardless of the letter and spirit of the law.”77  This 
dependency of the courts on the executive branch would only be more 
complete in a case involving the energy sector, especially with a foreign 
plaintiff.  As a result, TNK-BP must escape the Russian court system by 
 
 70. In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 411. 
 71. Id. at 410-11. 
 72. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 86. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 126. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 131. 
 77. See Hanson, supra note 15, at 484 (describing how members of the Russian court 
are effectively puppets of the political bosses). 
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establishing jurisdiction in a foreign country or in an international tribunal.  
Fortunately, the United States offers an opportunity to establish jurisdiction 
directly against the Russian Federation under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), which may prove effective at defending TNK-BP’s 
assets from expropriation by the Russian government. 
III. DEFENSIVE METHODS FOR TNK-BP 
A. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The first method for consideration, and TNK-BP’s better alternative, 
is to bring suit in the United States under a recognized cause of action, such 
as the taking of aliens’ property by a foreign government in violation of 
international law.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants 
blanket immunity to the acts of foreign sovereigns.  Certain exceptions 
exist to this general grant of immunity under the FSIA, and it is through 
these exceptions, and only these, that jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign 
can be had in a U.S. court.78  One of the exceptions stipulated in the FSIA 
is for the taking of private property by a foreign sovereign in violation of 
international law.79  The relevant piece of the FSIA is set forth as follows: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . (3) in 
which rights in property taken in violation of international law 
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is present in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
state; or that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of 
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in 
a commercial activity in the United States. . . .80 
As interpreted by the court in Altmann v. Republic of Austria, to 
establish that the expropriation exception applies to its (hypothetical) 
confiscation claim, TNK-BP would have to demonstrate three items:  (1) 
 
 78. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 962 (9th Cir. 2002); Altmann v. 
Republic of Austria, 142 F.Supp. 2d 1187, 1198 (C.D. Ca. 2001).  The Altmann case 
involved a suit brought by a U.S. citizen against Austria for the recovery of paintings 
allegedly expropriated by an instrumentality of the Austrian government during World War 
II.  Giuditta Cordero Moss mentions the Altmann case very briefly at the conclusion of 
Between Private and Public International Law:  Exorbitant Jurisdiction as Illustrated by the 
Yukos Case, hinting that Yukos may attempt to bring a claim under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.  See Cordero Moss, supra note 62, at 16-17. 
 79. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000); Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
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that the property was taken in violation of international law; (2) that the 
taken property is “owned or operated” by the defendant foreign state; and, 
viewing the two clauses (separated by the semicolon) of 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(3) cited above as disjunctive,81 (3) that the foreign state “is 
engaged in commercial activity in the United States.”  For a taking to be 
legitimate under international law, a) the taking must be for a public 
purpose; b) the alien owner must not have been discriminated against; and 
c) “payment of just compensation must be made.”82  The Altmann court 
describes “commercial activity” as follows:  “[W]hen a foreign government 
acts . . . in a manner of a private player within [the market], the foreign 
sovereign’s acts are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.”83 
Establishing the Application of the FSIA Expropriation Exception:  
Yukos’ Argument 
1. Violation of International Law 
Yukos could have potentially established all three of the expropriation 
exception elements set forth by the FSIA.  First, we consider the “in 
violation of international law” element.  As to the “public purpose” 
requirement, the Russian government may justify the confiscation of 
Yuganskneftegaz as a taking for the public purpose of revitalizing Russia 
and achieving greater social welfare.  Given the Putin administration’s 
energy ideology, this argument may prove persuasive, unless some 
evidence of corruption and self-dealing surfaced. 
Second, we examine the nondiscrimination requirement.  To begin, 
Yukos can make a strong argument that the Russian state took the property 
of foreign citizens in the auction of Yuganskneftegaz.  For one, American 
investors owned shares of Yukos, the price of which reflect the value of 
Yukos’ most productive asset, Yuganskneftegaz.  Indeed, Yukos 
emphasizes the fact that American investors owned 17 percent of Yukos 
common stock at various times, and that the auction damaged the value of 
that stock.84  Thus, the auction of Yuganskneftegaz effectively “took” away 
most of the value of Yukos’ common stock.  This equity value constitutes 
the taken property.  It is important that foreigners owned some of the 
 
 81. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1204 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 
(1992)). 
 84. Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction ¶¶ 17-18 at 7, In re Yukos Oil Co., Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
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Yukos property because a confiscation does not violate international law 
unless there is a taking of alien property.85  In F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. 
v. Brush, which involved the alleged expropriation of Cuban citizens’ 
property by the Castro government, the court held that no violation of 
international law had occurred because all of the parties were Cuban 
residents or citizens at the time of the alleged taking.  In the end, Yukos 
could have put forward the argument that the confiscation of 
Yuganskneftegaz constituted a taking of foreign property, which is required 
for a violation of international law. 
However, the question remains whether the Russian government 
discriminated against the foreign owners of Yukos stock.  The auction of 
Yuganskneftegaz and its subsequent acquisition by Rosneft amounts to an 
expropriation of both foreign and Russian citizens’ property.  Viewed from 
this perspective, the taking of Yuganskneftegaz did not, in itself, 
discriminate against aliens.  Consequently, the Russian government has a 
strong argument that it did not violate the nondiscrimination requirement of 
a legitimate taking. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the third requirement, “just 
compensation,” Yukos has the better argument.  Baikalfinansgroup’s 
winning bid in the Yuganskneftegaz auction “was less than half of what 
such an auction should have yielded.”86  The compensation that Yukos 
received for Yuganskneftegaz, particularly in light of the rigged “Loans for 
Shares” auctions of the 1990s,87 can hardly be characterized as fair. 
Consequently, while the Russian government arguably met the “public 
purpose” and nondiscrimination requirements of a legitimate taking of alien 
property under international law, the state failed to provide Yukos with 
“just compensation” for Yuganskneftegaz.  As a result, the auction of 
Yuganskneftegaz and its subsequent acquisition by Rosneft constituted a 
taking in violation of international law, thereby satisfying the first element 
of the FSIA expropriation exception. 
2. “Owned or Operated” by the Foreign State 
As for the second element of the FSIA expropriation exception, that 
the taken property must be “owned or operated” by the foreign 
government, Yukos would likely establish this element to the satisfaction 
of the court.  After all, following the Yuganskneftegaz auction, the state-
owned oil company Rosneft retained the formerly Yukos-owned property. 
 
 85. F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
 86. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 120. 
 87. See id. at 63-65 (describing the notorious, self-dealing “Loans for Shares” 
program). 
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3. “Engaged in Commercial Activity in the United States” 
Yukos’ greatest hurdle would be demonstrating that the Russian 
government engaged in “commercial activity”—in accordance with the 
FSIA meaning—within the United States.  First, the Altmann court held 
that the requirement of a connection between the taken property and the 
defendant government’s commercial activity in the United States that 
appears prior to the semicolon in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) does not carry 
over into the clause following the semicolon.88  Therefore, the plaintiff need 
not show that the foreign state’s commercial activity in the United States 
bears a relation to the expropriated property, or, in other words, the 
expropriation need not arise out of the commercial activity.  This makes 
Yukos’ argument easier to make.  Yukos would be hard pressed to find a 
clear link between Russian Federation commercial activity in the United 
States and the auction and state acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz.  In light of 
the Altmann court’s reading of the statute, however, Yukos only needs to 
show that the Russian government engaged in commercial activity—in 
some way—in the United States. 
Moreover, the Altmann court adopted a broad interpretation of 
“commercial activity.”  The court cited Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 
Argentina, a case involving the expropriation of a hotel in a foreign 
country.  The expropriated hotel solicited and entertained Americans, and 
accepted “payment from credit cards and traveler’s checks of those guests,” 
which was held to be “sufficient commercial activity to confer jurisdiction 
under the FSIA.”89  Given the reasoning in Altmann, Yukos could argue 
that the sale of Yuganskneftegaz to the state (Rosneft) constituted a 
transaction that may have involved stock owned by U.S. residents or 
citizens.  Also, the auction had clear effects in the United States on U.S. 
residents who owned stock in Yukos.  Indeed, the value of Yukos stock fell 
precipitously.90  Consequently, the auction of Yuganskneftegaz established 
commercial links between the Russian government and the United States.  
Yukos did, in fact, make the “effects doctrine” argument in its motion for a 
temporary restraining order in the Houston proceeding.91 
Overall, Yukos has a strong argument that the Russian government’s 
acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz amounts to an expropriation of alien 
property under the FSIA, and strips the Russian state of immunity from the 
 
 88. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
 89. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 90. Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 18 at 7, In re Yukos Oil Co., Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 17-18 at 7. 
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jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
TNK-BP’s Argument 
1. Violation of International Law 
TNK-BP has an even stronger argument than Yukos vis-à-vis the 
FSIA expropriation exception.  To begin, BP, a foreign company, owns 50 
percent of TNK-BP.  Therefore, no question arises—under F. Palicio y 
Compania—as to whether a confiscation of TNK-BP’s assets would affect 
aliens, and consequently, implicate international law.  Now we turn to the 
three requirements of a legitimate taking.  With regard to the first 
requirement, that the taking serve a “public purpose,” the Russian 
government can again argue that according to the state’s energy ideology, 
state ownership of TNK-BP’s assets will further the interests of the country 
as a whole.  As in the case of Yukos, such an argument may be persuasive, 
unless self-dealing played a role in the taking. 
Looking to the nondiscrimination requirement, the Russian 
government again makes a strong case:  confiscation of TNK-BP property 
would affect Russian and foreign investors equally, especially because of 
the fifty-fifty equity ownership structure.  Therefore, despite the fact that a 
taking of TNK-BP would negatively affect aliens, the acquisition would not 
be discriminatory. 
However, as with Yukos, TNK-BP would likely prevail on the “just 
compensation requirement,” as TNK-BP stands little chance of receiving a 
fair market price for its assets in any government-run auction.  As a result, 
TNK-BP could make a showing that the Russian government failed to meet 
the “just compensation” requirement, and thus took alien property in 
violation of international law.  In this way, TNK-BP would establish the 
first element of FSIA expropriation exception. 
2. “Owned or Operated” by the Foreign State 
As in Yukos’ case, TNK-BP could likely demonstrate that the Russian 
state owned or at least operated TNK-BP’s confiscated property, as the 
taken assets would move from TNK-BP to a front company—which would 
have won a government-directed auction—and, at last, to a state 
instrumentality such as Rosneft.92  Thus, TNK-BP could establish the 
second element of the FSIA expropriation exception. 
 
 92. See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 121-22 (describing other front companies, such as 
the entities “Prana” and “RN-Razvitiye,” that the author argues bid on behalf of Rosneft in 
subsequent auctions of Yukos property). 
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3. “Engaged in Commercial Activity in the United States” 
As for Yukos, TNK-BP’s greatest challenge would consist in 
demonstrating that the Russian Federation engaged in “commercial 
activity” within the United States.  Yet, as the Altmann court emphasized, 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) does not require that the commercial activity have a 
connection with the aliens’ taken property.93  As a consequence, any 
commercial activity—broadly construed as in Siderman de Blake and 
Altmann—conducted by the Russian government in the United States will 
satisfy the third FSIA element.  Thus, any advertising aimed at the 
American public or even the sale of Rosneft oil to the United States94 may 
qualify as “commercial activity” under the FSIA expropriation exception. 
In all, TNK-BP, like Yukos, would have a strong argument for the 
application of the FSIA expropriation exception, and consequently, the 
exercise of jurisdiction by American courts over the Russian government. 
Personal Jurisdiction Over the Russian Federation and Venue 
Even if Yukos and TNK-BP establish that the FSIA’s expropriation 
exception applies, the Russian state can challenge the lawsuit on personal 
jurisdiction grounds.  Personal jurisdiction over the Russian Federation did 
not play a role in Yukos’ Houston action, because in a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding, the relevant jurisdictional question is whether the 
court can exercise jurisdiction over the debtor.95  However, in a non-
bankruptcy suit brought under the FSIA, jurisdiction over the Russian state 
may arise.  Nevertheless, Yukos and TNK-BP would have strong 
arguments in support of the exercise of jurisdiction.  In Altmann, Austria 
raised a personal jurisdiction challenge, but the court reasoned that—in 
 
 93. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
 94. See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 3-4, 7 (noting that the United States imported $10 
billion of Russian petroleum in 2006, that Gazprom has begun to export liquefied natural 
gas to America, and that Gazprom hopes to supply ten percent of the United States’ natural 
gas by 2010); Winkler, supra note 6, at 120 n.23 (noting that Gazpromneft was supposed to 
merge with Rosneft prior to the issuance of the Houston bankruptcy court’s restraining order 
regarding the Yuganskneftegaz auction).  This abortive merger plan suggests the possibility 
that Gazprom and Rosneft may contemplate a merger in the future.  A successful merger 
between the two energy giants would likely mean that the Russian state would largely own 
Gazprom, which would arguably make Gazprom an instrumentality of the state, as Rosneft 
now is.  As a result, increasing exports of Russian petroleum and natural gas to the United 
States may strengthen future claims brought under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. 
 95. See In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 405-07 (affirming that congress meant for the “broad 
grant of jurisdiction” to U.S. bankruptcy courts to “extend[] to extraterritorial application of 
the Bankruptcy Code as it applies to property of the bankruptcy estate”); see also, Winkler, 
supra note 6, at 118-19 (asserting that the Houston bankruptcy court could exercise 
jurisdiction over the debtor’s property “wherever located” (footnote omitted)). 
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accordance with the act’s legislative history—FSIA itself establishes 
jurisdiction over the defendant sovereign once the plaintiff demonstrates 
that a FSIA exception applies.96  Moreover, the Altmann court held that a 
“foreign state is not a ‘person’ under the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution,” thereby rejecting the idea that the court must engage 
in a “minimum contacts” analysis to determine the appropriateness of 
jurisdiction over Austria.97 
As a result, Yukos and TNK-BP can defend against a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by pointing to the FSIA itself as a 
liberal grant of personal jurisdiction to the court over the Russian 
Federation.  Moreover, Yukos and TNK-BP can assert that the Russian 
state cannot claim Due Process Clause protection because the Russian 
government is not a person and thus has no “personal liberty interest”98—
which the Due Process Clause is meant to protect—at stake. 
As for venue, the Russian government probably cannot raise a 
successful challenge on this point.  The FSIA includes a provision for 
venue, which allows for the bringing of suit against the foreign state “in 
any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality [of the foreign 
state] . . . is doing business . . . or . . . in the United States District for the 
District of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or 
political subdivision thereof.”99  Consequently, Yukos and TNK-BP can 
likely establish venue in any city that imports petroleum or natural gas 
from an instrumentality of the Russian state, such as Rosneft, or any other 
place with which the Russian government has a commercial connection. 
Totality of the Circumstances 
In the end, the Houston court dismissed Yukos’ application for 
bankruptcy protection based on the “totality of the circumstances” in the 
case.100  Unlike challenges on jurisdictional or venue grounds, which the 
defendant raises, a court can sua sponte commence a totality of the 
circumstances analysis.  A totality of the circumstances challenge presents 
a difficult strategic problem for the plaintiff because of the amorphous, 
open-ended nature of the court’s reasoning.  For example, in the Yukos 
bankruptcy, the court considered a number of factors, including the fact 
that Yukos had commenced litigation in other non-U.S. fora; that the 
applicable substantive law required translation, a process that could itself 
prove contentious; and Yukos’ “sheer size” and “impact on the entirety of 
 
 96. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07. 
 97. Id. at 1208. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1214 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1)-(4) (2000)). 
 100. In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 411. 
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the Russian economy . . . .”101 
Nevertheless, TNK-BP has the benefit of a much more favorable 
factual background than Yukos.  While Yukos’ shareholding structure 
included only a minority of foreign investors,102 a foreign company–BP–
owns a full fifty percent of TNK-BP’s stock.  TNK-BP’s diverse ownership 
structure undermines the notion that Russian courts provide a natural forum 
for a dispute over alleged expropriation by the Russian state.  Indeed, 
despite the fact that TNK-BP’s assets sit primarily on Russian territory, the 
company’s activities, and troubles, affect investors in various parts of the 
world. 
Moreover, BP owns significant assets and has thousands of employees 
in the United States.103  BP maintains far more substantial contacts with the 
United States than Yukos.104  These facts favor litigation in the United 
States and undercut the notion that, in the totality of circumstances, Russia 
emerges as the clearly appropriate forum.  While BP’s presence in Russia 
through TNK-BP has direct effects on the Russian economy, the 
expropriation of TNK-BP’s assets would affect BP’s operations worldwide, 
including in the United States. 
Finally, the fact that Yukos initiated litigation in non-U.S. fora prior to 
bringing its bankruptcy action in Houston, weighed against the 
continuation of proceedings in the United States.105  Should TNK-BP fall 
victim to expropriation by the Russian state, the company should refrain 
from commencing litigation in Russia or other non-U.S. fora.  Yukos’ 
choice on non-U.S. fora suggests that Yukos considered these other fora to 
be both legitimate and fair.  Yukos’ implicit concession to the legitimacy of 
these non-U.S. fora simplified the Houston court’s decision to dismiss.  By 
contrast, if TNK-BP moves to litigate in the United States first, it would 
create a more favorable set of circumstances for itself by signaling its lack 
of faith in the fairness of alternative non-U.S. fora. 
The court has wide discretion when conducting a totality of the 
circumstances analysis.  Nevertheless, TNK-BP benefits from more 
favorable facts than Yukos, and given the closeness of the Houston court’s 
decision, a few more favorable circumstances could tip the balance in 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 12 at 5-6, In re Yukos Oil Co., Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 103. BP Global—BP in the United States, 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=488&contentId=2000734 (last 
visited April 4, 2009). 
 104. Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 13-16 at 4-5, In re Yukos Oil Co., Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 105. In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 411. 
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TNK-BP’s favor. 
Overall, bringing an action in the United States under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) would provide Yukos, and especially 
TNK-BP, with a solid chance for gaining access to a U.S. court and 
maintaining the litigation in the United States.  The FSIA offers the 
plaintiff three major advantages.  First, it is only through the FSIA that the 
plaintiff can establish jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, such as the 
Russian state.  Second, the FSIA streamlines questions of personal 
jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign, thereby neutralizing a major threat 
to the maintenance of the suit in the United States.  Finally, the FSIA 
virtually guarantees venue in the United States through its venue provision. 
B. International Arbitration in an ICSID Court 
Another litigation option for Yukos and TNK-BP is international 
arbitration under the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).  In his article Arbitration Without Privity and 
Russian Oil:  The Yukos Case Before the Houston Court, Matteo M. 
Winkler argues that Yukos could have access to an ICSID court because 
Russia has implicitly consented to ICSID jurisdiction via its provisional 
adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).106  As originally conceived, 
ICSID jurisdiction could be established only through the written consent of 
the parties.107  In the absence of such a formal written agreement between 
the investor and the state, “the traditional doctrine confirms that the 
investor has no other choice than to file claims before a national court.”108  
Thus, in keeping with the traditional approach, Yukos could not hope to 
establish ICSID jurisdiction over the Russian Federation, as no formal 
arbitration agreement exists between the two parties. 
However, Winkler argues, ICSID case law has effectuated a shift 
towards a more permissive doctrine:  “In those [ICSID] decisions, the lack 
of jurisdiction, which is the absence of the state’s consent, has been 
overcome by recognizing the consent of the state in the national laws or in 
international treaties to submit disputes to ICSID jurisdiction when dealing 
with foreign investment arbitrators.”109  For example, in the Pyramids case, 
a Hong Kong company sought ICSID jurisdiction against the Egyptian 
government, despite the absence of a formal arbitration agreement between 
 
 106. See Winkler, supra note 6, at 126-47 (explaining how ICSID jurisdiction is possible 
even in the absence of a specific arbitration agreement between the foreign investor and the 
host government, and applying this notion to the Yukos case). 
 107. Id. at 127. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 128. 
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the parties giving consent to ICSID jurisdiction.110  The ICSID court found 
jurisdiction based on the fact that Egypt had passed a law that “generally 
provided that all the investment disputes related to foreign investments 
would have been settled according to the ICSID convention and other 
international treaties applicable to Egypt.”111  A later case, Tradex Hellas v. 
Albania upheld the Pyramids court’s ruling, and reinforced the newly 
emerging doctrine “that internal laws can constitute an expression of 
consent according to article 25 of the [ICSID] Convention.”112 
The bottom line, according to Winkler, consists in the following:  
“Fundamentally, the recognition of ICSID jurisdiction through national 
legislation can be interpreted as a unilateral ‘offer’ to conclude an 
arbitration agreement directed from the state to the foreign investor who, in 
order to set up the arbitration proceedings, will be surely able to accept.”113  
Thus, even in the absence of a formal arbitration agreement, the state can 
still, in general, consent to ICSID jurisdiction through the passing of 
legislation.  An offer to litigate in an ICSID court can be accepted by a 
foreign investor by simply initiating an ICSID proceeding. 
Turning to Russia, we find that the Russian government has signed 
and must provisionally apply the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)—“the 
major international instrument regarding the sector of energy sources.”114  
The ECT forbids the nationalization of foreign investments or “measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation.”115  Also, the 
ECT provides that the foreign investor has a choice of either bringing 
claims in the host country’s national courts, or initiating international 
arbitration, including arbitration in a tribunal following the ICSID rules.116  
Consequently, Winkler concludes that because Russia provisionally applies 
the ECT, it also consents to ICSID jurisdiction in cases involving the 
alleged expropriation of a foreign investor’s property by the Russian 
government.117  Moreover, when a party commences ICSID arbitration in 
the U.S., and in the absence of a formal arbitration agreement specifying 
venue, the arbitration, in accordance with section 206 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 1976, “will take place in the district where the filing 
occurred.”118 
 
 110. Id. at 128-29.  For more details on the Pyramids case, see id. at 128 n.51. 
 111. Id. at 129-30 (footnote omitted). 
 112. Id. at 131.  For more details on the Tradex Hellas case, see id. at 130 n.57. 
 113. Id. at 131-32. 
 114. Id. at 137. 
 115. Id. at 138 (quoting ECT article 13.1); for the full citation of the ECT see id. at 132-
33 n.61. 
 116. Id. at 139. 
 117. Id. at 141. 
 118. Id. at 151 (referencing section 206 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act of 1976, 9 
U.S.C. § 206 (2000)). 
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Following this logic, TNK-BP, like Yukos, would have a strong 
argument for the establishment of ICSID jurisdiction over the Russian 
government.  Foreign investors owned a sizable minority of Yukos’ 
equity119 and foreign investors make up half of TNK-BP’s shareholding 
structure.120  Given this fact and the discussion above121 concerning the 
viability of Yukos’ and TNK-BP’s claims that the takings by the Russian 
state violate international law, both companies can lodge complaints 
against Russia under the ECT.  Because of the greater foreign participation 
in TNK-BP, this company likely has a better claim under the ECT than 
does Yukos. 
Unlike the argument presented above with regard to Yukos or TNK-
BP bringing a claim under the FSIA—for which relevant precedents 
exist—the reasoning behind the initiation of ICSID arbitration by either 
company remains highly speculative.  The ICSID courts do not appear to 
have dealt with a case basing ICSID jurisdiction on a state’s provisional 
application of the ECT.  Winkler himself concludes soberly:  “At this point, 
one should remember nevertheless [sic] that it could be very difficult to 
compel arbitration against the Russian Federation before a U.S. court.”122 
Despite the uncertainty over whether an ICSID court would find 
jurisdiction over the Russian state under the ECT in the absence of a 
written arbitration agreement, TNK-BP should avoid the temptation of 
signing a formal agreement.  It is unlikely that the Russian state would 
consent to venue in an arbitral tribunal sitting in the United States.  
However, if no agreement exists between TNK-BP and Russia concerning 
venue, TNK-BP could initiate arbitration in a U.S. ICSID court and, by the 
operation of section 206 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act of 1976, that 
court will become the venue for the arbitration.  Arbitral proceedings in the 
United States would most likely prove more impartial in a case involving 
TNK-BP than Russian arbitral courts. 
Of the two defensive methods presented in this section—bringing suit 
in the United States under the FSIA’s expropriation exception and initiating 
ICSID arbitration—the first remains TNK-BP’s better alternative.  Several 
favorable precedents exist applying the FSIA to expropriations of aliens’ 
property, including Altmann v. Republic of Austria and Siderman de Blake 
v. Republic of Argentina.  Moreover, the FSIA’s provisions make it much 
easier for the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction over the defendant sovereign.  
 
 119. Plaintiff’s Verified Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 12 at 5-6, In re Yukos Oil Co., Nos. 04-47742-H3-11, 04-03952 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 120. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 126. 
 121. See supra Part IIIA, The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Violation of 
International Law. 
 122. Winkler, supra note 6, at 151. 
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The FSIA also streamlines venue, virtually guaranteeing a forum for the 
litigants.  While the FSIA does require that the foreign state engage in 
commercial activity within the United States, the Altmann court’s 
insistence on a disjunctive reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) simplifies the 
plaintiff’s task.  Pursuant to Altmann’s holding, the plaintiff need only 
demonstrate that the defendant sovereign engages in some commercial 
activity in the United States, without also having to show a connection 
between that activity and the taken property.  Overall, the provisions of the 
FSIA’s expropriation exception favor TNK-BP’s case. 
On the other hand, pursuing ICSID arbitration, while a potentially 
attractive alternative, rests on far shakier ground.  For one, Russia has not 
ratified the ICSID convention.  Russia has adopted the ECT and applied it 
provisionally, and the ECT does provide for arbitration in an ICSID court.  
While Winkler’s logic is compelling, in practice the links between Russia’s 
provisional application of the ECT and consent to ICSID jurisdiction are 
attenuated.  Furthermore, solid precedent on the connection between the 
ECT and ICSID jurisdiction does not seem to exist.  Consequently, the 
safer, more predictable route is to litigate in the United States under the 
FSIA expropriation exception. 
CONCLUSION 
The Putin administration has consciously and specifically exerted 
greater state control over Russia’s energy sector.  The change stands in 
stark contrast to the free-wheeling laissez-faire attitude characteristic of the 
Yeltsin years.  Putin’s notions rest on ideological and practical 
considerations and center around the dual project of reclaiming Russia’s 
superpower status and raising Russians’ standard of life.  Through the 
dismemberment of Yukos, the Russian government has demonstrated its 
willingness to expropriate the assets of private energy companies in order 
to further Russian grand strategy.  Other private oil companies operating in 
Russia, such as TNK-BP, have felt the state’s coercive pressure and remain 
prime targets for expropriation, should such a move dovetail with Kremlin 
political strategy. 
Despite threats from the state, TNK-BP and Yukos do have legal 
alternatives:  bringing suit in the United States under the expropriation 
exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and initiating 
ICSID arbitration.  The literature and case law suggest that of these two 
litigation options, bringing suit under the FSIA is the surer approach.  The 
FSIA’s provisions streamline the often problematic questions of 
jurisdiction over the foreign state and venue, and ease the plaintiff’s task in 
showing commercial activity of the defendant sovereign in the United 
States.  Moreover, favorable precedents would buttress TNK-BP’s and 
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Yukos’ claims and add predictability to the proceedings. 
In the end, the main legal strategy for TNK-BP and other private 
energy firms in Russia must consist in escaping the Russian court system.  
Particularly in cases involving the energy sector, the dominance of the 
executive branch over the courts effectively bars private petroleum and 
natural gas firms’ access to justice.  Fortunately, legal mechanisms exist for 
getting these companies’ claims into U.S. courts or international tribunals. 
This comment leaves the question of choice of law for another 
academic investigation.  Most likely, Russian law will apply in many 
instances.  However, the application of Russian law by impartial and 
independent non-Russian courts remains a more preferable route for private 
energy companies than litigating their claims in Russian domestic courts.  
Until Russian courts can create meaningful distance between themselves 
and the Kremlin in cases involving the energy sector, potential victims of 
expropriation, such as TNK-BP, will have to look beyond Russia’s borders 
for their day in court. 
